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Cujus est dare, ejus est disponere.1
I. Introduction
Estate planning attorneys seek to help clients manage and distribute their
wealth so that it can be used for personal benefit during life and passed down
to their loved ones upon death.2 A trust is an estate planning tool that helps
accomplish these goals.3 To create a trust, a fiduciary relationship must be formed
* J.D. Candidate, University of Wyoming College of Law, 2015. Thank you to Bailey
Schreiber, Kyle Hendrickson, Brianne Phillips, Professor Mark Glover, and the rest of the Wyoming
Law Review Board for their assistance and guidance throughout the writing process. A big thank you
to my fiancé, David Singleton, and my parents, Greg and Jodie. This paper would not have been
possible without your encouraging words and continuous support.
This maxim, meaning “whose it is to give, his it is to dispose,” has been used to justify
the use of spendthrift trusts. See Gideon Rothschild & Daniel S. Rubin, Planning with Spendthrift
Trusts, 1.4 Estate Tax Planning Advisor 1 (May 2002), available at http://www.mosessinger.com/
site/files/spendthrift.pdf.
1

2

Id.

Trusts have become increasingly popular tools for individuals to express their intentions
for transferring assets to loved ones. Christopher M. Reimer, The Undiscovered Country: Wyoming’s
Emergence as a Leading Trust Situs Jurisdiction, 11 Wyo. L. Rev. 165, 167 (2011) (“Trusts have
3

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2015

1

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 15 [2015], No. 2, Art. 9

552

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 15

requiring one person to hold property subject to an equitable obligation to keep
or distribute that property for the benefit of another.4 Generally, a trust does
not, in and of itself, prevent a beneficiary’s creditors from reaching trust assets.
However, a spendthrift trust contains a “spendthrift provision” prohibiting the
beneficiary of a trust from voluntarily transferring an interest in the trust to a
third party.5 The spendthrift provision also prevents creditors from reaching
the trust through garnishment or attachment.6 Thus, a spendthrift trust is a
beneficial way for a grantor to transfer assets to a beneficiary without the risk of
creditor attachment.
A more recent development in estate planning is the self-settled spendthrift
trust, also known as the “asset protection trust:” a trust created by an individual
for his or her own benefit.7 Usually, spendthrift provisions are unenforceable
when the trust is self-settled, meaning that the individual creating the trust is
also the beneficiary.8 Historically, courts have found self-settled spendthrift trusts
inherently fraudulent because the trusts allow debtors to insulate themselves from
the claims of creditors.9 Therefore, courts have found self-settled spendthrift trusts
to be unenforceable; once the spendthrift provision is found to be unenforceable,
creditors may obtain judgments from the trust assets.10 However, in recent years,
a number of states have passed statutes allowing settlors to shield assets from
creditors in self-settled trusts.11 Wyoming is one of these states.12
historically been employed by the very wealthy; however, as they have grown in popularity over
the last few decades, their use as an estate planning tool has expanded among the middle and
upper-middle classes.”); Abigail Maurer, Chapter 106: In Hearsay We Trust, 42 McGeorge L. Rev.
567, 567 (2011) (“Revocable trusts are one of the most common testamentary devices used in
estate planning.”); Steven Seidenberg, Plotting Against Probate: Efforts by Estate Planners, Courts and
Legislatures to Minimize Probate Haven’t Killed It Yet, 94 A.B.A. J. 57, 58 (May 2008) (“There is, for
instance, a boom in revocable living trusts.”).
4

Amy Morris Hess, George Gleason Bogert, & George Taylor Bogert, Bogert’s Trust
§ 1 (2014).

and Trustees

5
Richard C. Ausness, The Offshore Asset Protection Trust: A Prudent Financial Planning
Device or the Last Refuge of a Scoundrel, 45 Duq. L. Rev. 147, 150 (2007).
6

Id.

7

See infra note 39 and accompanying text.

Timothy O. Beppler & Christopher M. Reimer, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: A
Comparison of the Laws of Utah and Wyoming, 23 Utah B.J. 12, 12 (Apr. 2010); Ausness, supra
note 5, at 150.
8

9
Ausness, supra note 5, at 183; Adam J. Hirsch, Fear Not the Asset Protection Trust, 27
Cardozo L. Rev. 2685, 2685 (2006) (“The dawn of this new species of domestic “asset protection
trust” has aroused declarations—and declamations—of concern, much as its close relative and
doctrinal progenitor, the spendthrift trust, once did.”).

See e.g., Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 624 F. Supp.2d 970, 976 (N.D. Ill. 2009); In re
Kuraishi, 237 B.R. 172, 176–77 (Cal. C.D. 1999); Security Pacific Bank Washington v. Chang, 80
F.3d 1412, 1418 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Brown, 303 F.3d 1261, 1271 (11th Cir. 2002).
10

11

Beppler & Reimer, supra note 8, at 12.

12

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 4-10-510 to -523 (2013).
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This comment argues the Wyoming self-settled spendthrift trust, known as
the Qualified Spendthrift Trust, is a beneficial component to Wyoming’s Uniform
Trust Code. It looks at the history of asset protection trusts and the development
of domestic asset protection trust statutes.13 Next, it discusses common criticisms
of self-settled spendthrift trusts.14 Finally, this comment argues that states should
follow Wyoming’s lead in creating self-settled spendthrift trust statutes for three
reasons.15 First, the self-settled spendthrift trust provides substantial benefits to
settlors.16 Second, there are significant economic considerations for allowing
self-settled spendthrifts trusts.17 Third, Wyoming’s statute provides sufficient
limitations of the self-settled spendthrift trust to protect against abuse and
defrauding of creditors.18

II. Background
A trust is a legal arrangement in which a settlor appoints a trustee to hold property
as a fiduciary for one or more beneficiaries.19 A valid trust must include a settlor
and trustee, intent to create a trust, ascertainable trust res, sufficiently ascertainable
beneficiaries, a legal purpose, and a legal term.20 The settlor is the individual who
creates the trust.21 Creation includes, but is not limited to, designating beneficiaries,
declaring terms for distribution, designating a trustee and successor trustee, and
determining what property will be transferred into the trust.22
At the time the trust is created, the trustee takes legal title to the trust property.23
A trustee can be either an individual or an entity.24 The trustee’s role is to manage
13

See infra Part II.C–F.

14

See infra Part II.G–H.

15

See infra Part III.

16

See infra Part III.A.

17

See infra Part III.B.

18

See infra Part III.C.

19

Hess et al., supra note 4, § 1.

Hilbert v. Benson, 917 P.2d 1152 (Wyo. 1996). In another case, the Wyoming Supreme
Court stated:
20

The clearly expressed intention of the settlor should be zealously guarded by the courts,
particularly when the trust instrument reveals a careful and painstaking expression of
the use and purposes to which the settlor’s financial accumulations shall be devoted. A
settlor must have assurance that his solemn arrangements and instructions will not be
subject to the whim or suggested expediency of others after his death.
First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Wyo. v. Brimmer, 504 P.2d 1367, 1371 (Wyo. 1973).
21

Hess et al., supra note 4, § 41.

22

Id.

23
First Nat’l Bank of Cincinnati v. Tenney, 138 N.E.2d 15, 18–19 (Ohio 1956) (“In order for
a trust to be a trust, the legal title of the res must immediately pass to the trustee, and the beneficial
or equitable interest to the beneficiaries.”).
24

Hess et al., supra note 4, § 121.
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the settlor’s property in the best interest of the beneficiaries.25 The trustee must
make disbursements of income and principal to beneficiaries in accordance with
the terms of the trust agreement.26 Trustees often have the discretion to invest
trust property with the intent of furthering the trust’s purpose.27 Trustees also
have the responsibility of recordkeeping and accounting, as well as bringing and
defending claims on behalf of the trust.28
Beneficiaries have equitable title, which allows them to hold the trustee
accountable for breach of the trustee’s fiduciary duties.29 Typically, beneficiaries
are entitled to periodic distributions from the trust income and sometimes from
the trust principal as well.30 Trustees can distribute income of the trust to the
beneficiary at intervals specified in the trust, therefore allowing the beneficiary to
receive a steady stream of income, rather than one large gift.31 Trusts can be used for
a number of purposes—everything from providing financial support for a surviving
spouse and children to structuring payments in order to reduce estate taxes.32

A. Spendthrift Trusts
While once controversial, all states now recognize spendthrift trusts in
some form or another.33 A spendthrift trust is a trust document that includes a
spendthrift provision specifically prohibiting the beneficiary from alienating their
interest to a third party. A beneficiary of a trust without a spendthrift provision
generally has the freedom to transfer or assign their interest in the trust to

25

Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 2 cmt.b (2003).

Joanne E. Hindel et al., Discretionary, Delegating, or Directed: Duties and Responsibilities of
Trustees, 17 Ohio Prob. L.J. 187, 187 (2007).
26

27

Id.

28

Id.

Id.; see Stewart E. Sterk, Trust Protectors, Agency Costs, and Fiduciary Duty, 27 Cardozo
L. Rev. 2761, 2761 (2006) (“[A] number of familiar fiduciary duties—including the duty of
impartiality, the duty to invest for total return, and the duty of care—operate to align the interests
of the trustee with those of the settlor and the beneficiaries.”).
29

Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive Perspectives, 73
Wash. U.L. Q. 1, 2 (1995).
30

31

Id.

American Bar Association, Trusts 1, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/migrated/publiced/practical/books/wills/chapter_4.authcheckdam.pdf (“A trust can do a
number of things a will can’t do, as well, including manage assets efficiently if you should die and
your beneficiaries are minor children or others not up to the responsibility of handling the estate;
protect your privacy (unlike a will, a trust is confidential); depending on how it is written, and
on state law, a trust can protect your assets by reducing taxes; if it is a living trust, the trustee can
manage property for you while you’re alive, providing a way to care for you if you should become
disabled. A living trust also avoids probate, lowers estate administration costs, and speeds transfer of
your assets to beneficiaries after your death.”).
32

33

Hess et al., supra note 4, § 222 n.64.
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another.34 Additionally, a creditor seeking repayment from the beneficiary could
attach a lien to the assets of the trust if that trust did not contain a spendthrift
provision. A typical spendthrift provision reads:
Except for transfers among family members, no beneficiary of a
trust shall alienate, encumber or hypothecate his or her interest
in the principal or income of a trust in any manner; and to the
fullest extent of the law, the interests of any beneficiary shall
not be subject to the claims of his or her creditors or be liable
to attachment, execution or other process of law. Further, the
interest of each beneficiary in the income and principal of the
trust hereunder shall be free from the control or interference
of any creditor of a beneficiary or any spouse of any married
beneficiary and shall not be subject to attachment or susceptible
of anticipation or alienation. Nothing contained in this paragraph
shall be construed as restricting in any way the exercise of any
powers or discretions granted hereunder.35
A spendthrift trust usually contains two common provisional restrictions.
First, a spendthrift provision prevents a beneficiary from voluntarily assigning
his interest in the trust to another.36 For example, the spendthrift provision
prohibits the beneficiary from using his interest in the trust as collateral for
a loan or assigning the interest over to pay off a debt to a creditor. Second, a
spendthrift provision prevents a creditor from reaching the beneficiary’s interest
in the trust.37 The creditor generally cannot attach a lien or otherwise access the
trust assets.38 The creditor, however, can reach the beneficiary’s interest in the trust
once the beneficiary actually receives the distribution.39 Once the trustee makes
a distribution of trust income to the beneficiary, that money and/or property
becomes freely alienable.
Settlors began to include spendthrift provisions in their trusts to keep
beneficiaries from squandering their interest by handing it over to creditors.40
Often this is a concern when parents are transferring wealth to children with a
34
Id.; Justin W. Stark, Montana’s Spendthrift Trust Doctrine: Analysis and Recommendations, 57
Mont. L. Rev. 211, 212 (1996).
35

Mason v. Mason, 798 So.2d 895, 897 (D. Fla. 2001).

36

William H. Wicker, Spendthrift Trusts, 10 Gonz. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1974).

37

Id.

38

Hirsch, supra note 30, at 2.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-502(c) (2015). (“[A] beneficiary may not transfer an interest
in a trust in violation of a spendthrift provision and, a creditor or assignee of the beneficiary
may not reach the interest or attach a distribution by the trustee unless and until it is received by
the beneficiary.”).
39

Alan Newman, The Rights of Creditors of Beneficiaries Under the Uniform Trust Code: An
Examination of the Compromise, 69 Tenn. L Rev. 771, 772 (2002).
40
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poor credit history or spending habits. Spendthrift trusts can also be used for
mentally incompetent individuals who the settlor believes are unable to manage
their own affairs.41 The settlor might also include a spendthrift provision when
he wants to ensure that the beneficiary uses the trust assets for a specific purpose,
such as education.42

B. Traditional Approach to Self-Settled Spendthrift Trusts/Asset
Protection Trusts
A self-settled spendthrift trust, also known as an “asset protection trust,” is a
trust created by the settlor for his or her own benefit.43 Historically, the general
rule for self-settled spendthrift trusts is that the trust does not shield the settlor/
beneficiary from claims of creditors.44 In Matter of Brooks, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated this general rule was designed to prevent
the settlor from accessing assets of the trust while simultaneously insulating these
same assets from creditors.45 The Fifth Circuit also held the general rule prevented
debtors from withdrawing funds for their own benefit immediately after all debts
were discharged.46 In other words, “[o]ne may wish to have one’s cake and eat it,
too, but the law need not bring the wish to fruition.”47
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also held that a
self-settled spendthrift trust was unenforceable against the settlor’s creditors; the
court found it was immaterial whether there was an intent to defraud or whether
the settlor was solvent at the time.48 Further, a California bankruptcy court found
a self-settled spendthrift trust unenforceable regardless of the fact that the primary
purpose of the trust was to be used to pay the individual’s pension.49
41

Trusts, supra note 32, at 8.

42

Id.

Amy Lynn Wagenfeld, Law for Sale: Alaska and Delaware Compete for the Asset Protection
Trust Market and the Wealth that Follows, 32 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 831, 839 (1999) (“To create this
ideal trust a settlor transfers his assets into trust, names himself as a beneficiary, includes a provision
that the trust holdings may not be voluntarily or involuntarily alienated prior to distribution, and
appoints as trustee either himself or a third party over whom he retains certain powers.”).
43

44
Unif. Trust Code § 505 cmt. (2010) (“Subsection(a)(2) . . . follows traditional doctrine
in providing that a settlor who is also a beneficiary may not use the trust as a shield against the
settlor’s creditors. The drafters of the Uniform Trust Code concluded that traditional doctrine
reflects sound policy. Consequently, the drafters rejected the approach taken in States like Alaska
and Delaware, both of which allow a settlor to retain a beneficial interest immune from creditor
claims.”); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 156(1) (2014) (“Where a person creates for his or her
own benefit a trust with a provision restraining the voluntary or involuntary transfer of his interest,
his transferee or creditors can reach his interest.”).
45

Matter of Brooks, 844 F.2d 258, 261 (5th Cir. 1988).

46

Id.

47

In re Robbins, 826 F.2d 293, 295 (4th Cir. 1987).

48

In re Brown, 303 F.3d 1261, 1268 (11th Cir. 2002).

49

In re Kuraishi, 237 B.R. 172 (Cal. C.D. 1999).
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C. Offshore Asset Protection Trusts
Due to the restrictions in the United States on self-settled spendthrift trusts
(asset protection trusts), settlors began creating these trusts offshore to protect
assets.50 Offshore asset protection trusts are established in foreign jurisdictions
by settlors who wish to keep assets out of reach of domestic creditors.51 The
formation of an offshore asset protection trust is similar to the creation of a
self-settled spendthrift trust in the United States, except these trusts are formed
under laws of a foreign jurisdiction—a jurisdiction that enforces self-settled
trusts.52 The beneficiary of an offshore protection trust is the settlor or the
settlor’s family members, and the trustee is generally a foreign trust company
or financial institution.53 These foreign trusts force creditors to bring actions
in foreign jurisdictions that are generally more “debtor friendly” and find selfsettled spendthrift trusts valid.54 However, offshore asset protection trusts are
not always successful.55 For example, real property is governed by the location
of the property.56 Therefore, actions concerning United States property will be
adjudicated domestically, and therefore, a foreign trust will still be subject to
creditor attachment.57
In 1994, it was estimated that more than one trillion dollars of foreign trust
funds were in asset protection trusts.58 Settlors favored these offshore trusts
because foreign trusts are less accessible and, for the most part, are free from
the constraints of United States law.59 However, offshore asset protection trusts
were, and still are, heavily criticized.60 It has been argued that these offshore trusts
“offend the public policy of the overwhelming majority of American states,”

Ausness, supra note 5, at 151–52; Jonathan L. Mezrich, It’s Better in the Bahamas: Asset
Protection Trusts for the Pennsylvania Lawyer, 98 Dick. L. Rev. 657, 675 (1994) (“[A]sset protection
is simply a reasonable reaction to today’s ‘court-happy’ society, and should be allowed until the U.S.
judiciary or legal community finds a way to rein-in damaging, frivolous lawsuits and litigiousness.”).
50

51

Ausness, supra note 5, at 152.

Elena Marty-Nelson, Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Having Your Cake and Eating it Too,
47 Rutgers L. Rev. 11, 13 (1994).
52

53

Id.

Paul M. Roder, American Asset Protection Trusts: Alaska and Delaware Move ‘Offshore’ Trusts
onto the Mainland, 49 Syracuse L. Rev. 1253, 1257 (1999).
54

55

Id. at 1259–61.

56

Id. at 1260.

57

Id.

Ritchie W. Taylor, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: The “Estate Planning Tool of the Decade”
or a Charlatan?, 13 BYU J. Pub. L. 163, 164 (1998).
58

59

Reimer, supra note 19, at 168.

60

See infra Part II.G.
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frustrate domestic courts’ jurisdiction, and disregard public policy.61 Still, others
see that there are ethical and unethical ways to use such trusts.62

D. Statutory Self-Settled Spendthrift Trusts
As of April 2014, sixteen states, including Wyoming, have passed legislation
allowing for self-settled spendthrift trusts/asset protection trusts, similar to off
shore trusts.63 While each statute attempts to achieve the goal of asset protection,
they vary in formation requirements, protection exceptions, and burden of
proof requirements for fraudulent transfer actions.64 This section will look at
four of these statutes, comparing some of the similarities and differences from
state to state.
In 1997, Alaska and Delaware became the first two states to enact legislation
allowing for self-settled spendthrift trusts.65 For a trust to come under the protection
of Alaska and Delaware’s statutes, the trust must be irrevocable, must expressly state
that it is governed by that state’s law, and must contain a spendthrift provision.66
However, there are exceptions to both Delaware and Alaska’s statutes; these
exceptions make trust assets vulnerable to certain creditor claims. Delaware does
not shield trust assets from child support claims, alimony payments, or property
division upon divorce.67 Therefore, individuals in arrears of their support
obligations are unable to avoid making payments by safeguarding assets within
the trust.68 Delaware’s asset protection also does not apply to “any person who
suffers death, personal injury or property damage . . . caused in whole or in part
by the tortious act or omission of either such transferor or by another person for

61
Randall J. Gingiss, Putting a Stop to “Asset Protection” Trusts, 51 Baylor L. Rev. 987, 1032
(1999); F.T.C. v. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d 1228, 1240 (9th Cir. 1999); In re Lawrence, 251
B.R. 630 (Fla. S.D. 2000) (“[S]uch a strategy contravenes the clear public policy against allowing
a debtor to shield money placed in a trust for his or her own benefit from creditors, [and] defies
common sense.”).
62
Breitenstine v. Breitenstine, 62 P.3d 587, 593 (Wyo. 2003) (“While such trusts may have
benefits in asset protection, the use of such trusts to avoid alimony, child support, and a fair division
of marital property upon divorce is reprehensible to us.”).
63
David G. Shaftel, Comparison of the Domestic Asset Protection Trust Statutes, American
College of Trust and Estate Counsel (Apr. 2014). These states are Alaska, Colorado, Delaware,
Hawaii, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming.
64

Id.

Alaska Stat. §§ 13.36.310, 34.40.110 (2015); Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, §§ 3570–3576
(2015); Wagenfeld, supra note 38, at 831.
65

66

Alaska Stat. §§ 13.36.310, 34.40.110 (2015); Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, §§ 3570–3576 (2015).

67

Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, §§ 3573 (2015).

68

Id.
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whom such transferor is or was vicariously liable.”69 Thus, plaintiffs are allowed
to collect judgments from trust assets on these claims. Alaska, however, has fewer
exceptions to the asset protection rule. Alaska does not provide an exception for
alimony payments or tort claims and only provides a limited exception for child
support claims and property division upon divorce.70
Lastly, both statutes provide exceptions for fraudulent transfers, requiring a
showing of intent to defraud.71 This exception allows the creditor to reach trust
assets regardless of the spendthrift provision when it is shown that the settlor
intended to avoid payment.72
One of the most settlor-friendly states for creating an asset protection trust
is Nevada. Nevada’s statute allows a self-settled spendthrift trust to shelter trust
assets against child support obligations, alimony claims, tort actions, and property
division upon divorce.73 The state legislature does, however, apply the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) to set aside transfers made with the intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.74 The UFTA prohibits a debtor from avoiding
paying a debt by transferring the money or asset to another person before the
debt is collected.75 Among other things, the UFTA looks at whether the assets
were concealed, whether adequate consideration was given when the property
was transferred, and whether the debtor still had possession and control of the
property even after the transfer.76
Much like the exceptions to creditor protection, formation requirements for
self-settled spendthrift trusts vary from state to state. Formation requirements are
the essential elements the trust must include before it is entitled to spendthrift
protection, such as restrictions on revocation and an explicit spendthrift clause.
For example, most asset protection trust statutes require the trust be irrevocable.77

69

Id.

70

Alaska Stat. §§ 34.40.1109(b)(4) & (l) (2015).

Alaska Stat. §§ 34.40.110 (2015) (“[T]he transfer restriction prevents a creditor . . . from
satisfying a claim out of a beneficiary’s interest in the trust, unless the creditor . . . establishes by
clear and convincing evidence that the settlor’s transfer of property in trust was made with intent
to defraud that creditor.”); Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 3572 (2015) (“[N]o action should be
brought . . . unless the qualified disposition was made with actual intent to defraud such creditor.”).
71

72

See Alaska Stat. §§ 34.40.110 (2015); Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 3572 (2015).

73

Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 166.010 to -.170 (2015).

74

Id. §§ 166.170, 112.180.

Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Fraudulent Transfers
Act (1984), available at https://www.stcl.edu/faculty_pages/faculty_folders/rosin/ufta84.pdf.
75

76

Id. § 4.

See e.g., S.D. Codified Laws § 55-16-2 (2015); Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-16-102(7) (2015);
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-14 (2015); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 554G-2 (2015).
77
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However, Oklahoma allows both revocable and irrevocable trusts to safeguard
assets.78 Despite the variability from state to state, goals of self-settled spendthrift
trust statutes are the same—protect the settlor from unintended alienation while
providing public policy exceptions for creditors who are more vulnerable to
fraudulent behavior.

E. Wyoming’s Qualified Spendthrift Trust
In 2007, Wyoming passed a statute allowing “Qualified Spendthrift Trusts”
(QST).79 Wyoming allows a settlor to create a self-settled spendthrift trust if the
instrument states it is a “Qualified Spendthrift Trust,” governed by Wyoming
law, subject to a spendthrift provision, and is irrevocable.80 Wyoming defines a
“spendthrift provision” as “a term of a trust which restrains either a voluntary or
an involuntary transfer, or both, of a beneficiary’s interest.”81 Only qualified trust
property can be held in a QST. “Qualified trust property includes real property,
personal property and interests in real or personal property . . . which: (i) Are
the subject of a qualified transfer; and (ii) Are acquired with the proceeds of
property of a qualified transfer.”82 A “qualified transfer” is a transfer, conveyance,
or assignment of property to a qualified trustee with or without consideration.83
The statute also requires a qualified transfer affidavit, written and sworn by the
settlor.84 In the affidavit, the settlor must state they have the “full right, title, and
authority to transfer the property to the qualified spendthrift trust,” the property
was not obtained through unlawful means, the transfer will not render the settlor
insolvent, and the transfer is not intended to defraud any creditors.85 The settlor
must also assert that there is no pending litigation against him, and that he is not
currently involved in any administrative proceedings.86 The affidavit also ensures
the settlor is not in default of any child support obligations or contemplating
bankruptcy.87 Finally, the settlor must maintain one million dollars in personal
liability insurance or provide coverage equal to the fair market value of the trust
assets, whichever is less.88

78

Okla. Stat. tit. 31 § 11(5) (2015).

79

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 4-10-510 to -523 (2013).

80

Id. § 4-10-510; Beppler & Reimer, supra note 8, at 15.
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Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-103(a)(xix) (2013).
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Id. § 4-10-511.
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Id. § 4-10-512.
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Creditors have limited ability to reach QST property under Wyoming statute.
The property of the trust is not subject to claims of creditors unless the creditor
can prove by clear and convincing evidence that it was a fraudulent transfer in
violation of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act.89 Each creditor must produce
proof of a fraudulent transfer—“proof by one creditor, assignee or agent that a
transfer of property to a QST was fraudulent or wrongful does not constitute
proof as to any other creditor.”90
However, there are other circumstances, beyond fraudulent conveyances,
when the QST does not shield a debtor’s assets.91 First, similar to other states’
statutes, the spendthrift provision is not enforceable against child support claims.92
Second, the provision is unenforceable against “[a] financial institution with
which the settlor has listed qualified trust property on the financial institution’s
application or financial statement used to obtain or maintain credit from the
financial institution other than for the benefit of the QST.”93

F. Criticisms of Self-Settled Spendthrift Trusts/Asset Protection Trusts
Self-settled spendthrift trusts receive substantial criticism. Those opposing
self-settled spendthrift trusts argue these trusts “give unexampled opportunity
to unscrupulous persons to shelter their property before engaging in speculative
business enterprises.”94 Opponents conclude the trusts “promote a culture in which
individuals are not held accountable for their actions.”95 It encourages people to
engage in risky behavior with the assurance of knowing they are protected from
losing their shielded assets.96
Critics believe that self-settled spendthrift trusts “mislead creditors into
thinking the settlor still owned the property since he appeared to be receiving its
income, and thereby work a gross fraud on creditors who might place reliance
on the former prosperity and financial stability of the debtor.”97 Opponents of

89

Id. § 4-10-517.

90

Id.

91

Id. § 4-10-520.

92

Id.

93

Id.

94

Richard C. Ausness, supra note 5, at 184.

Kevin R. McKinnis, The Good, the Bad, and a New Kind of Prenup: An Analysis of the Ohio
Legacy Trust Act and What Asset Protection Trusts Will Mean for Ohio, 61 Clev. St. L. Rev. 1105,
1125 (2013).
95

96

Id. at 1125–26.

97

Id.
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the self-settled trust also fear these trusts can be deceptive—“creating a false
appearance of creditworthiness[,]” thereby allowing debtors to fool creditors into
loaning money while their assets sit protected and out of creditor reach.98
A common criticism of asset protection trusts is that they are unethical and
inherently fraudulent—they allow settlors to avoid paying their debts.99 Critics
argue that passing self-settled spendthrift trust statutes is “an unfortunate trend,
heralding the onset of a race among the states to provide the most attractive forum
for trust business.”100 Some argue there is no equal protection of the law because
only the wealthy have the means to fund such trusts.101 Additionally, critics argue
creditors would have to be even more diligent in screening their borrowers before
loaning money, resulting in increased administrative costs to lenders.102
It is also argued that self-settled spendthrift trusts will make defendants
judgment proof, “provid[ing] a way for doctors, lawyers, or other professionals to
shield personal assets from malpractice and other tortious claims.”103 These trusts
would subsequently prevent creditors and plaintiffs from obtaining judgments
awarded to them in lawsuits.104

III. Analysis
Despite the common criticisms and hesitations of allowing self-settled
spendthrift trusts, Wyoming’s self-settled spendthrift trust is a beneficial component
to Wyoming’s Uniform Trust Code, and states should follow Wyoming’s lead for
three reasons. First, the self-settled spendthrift trust provides substantial benefits
to settlors.105 Second, there are significant economic considerations for allowing
self-settled spendthrift trusts.106 Finally, Wyoming’s statute provides sufficient
limitations of the self-settled spendthrift trust to protect against the abuse and the
defrauding of creditors.107

98

Hirsch, supra note 9, at 2687; Ausness, supra note 5, at 184.

99

Darsi Newman Sirknen, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: What’s the Big Deal?, 8 Trans
J. Bus. L. 133, 142 (2006)

actions: Tenn.
100

Hirsch, supra note 9, at 2686 (citations omitted).

101

Sirknen, supra note 99, at 143.

102

McKinnis, supra note 95, at 1125.

103

Id. at 1120–22.

104

Id. at 1125.
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See infra Part III.A.
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See infra Part III.B.

107

See infra Part III.C.
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A. Benefits of the Self-Settled Spendthrift Trust to the Settlor
The self-settled spendthrift trust provides substantial benefits to settlors, and
state legislatures seem to agree. The Wyoming legislature and the legislatures in
fifteen other states have decided that an asset protection trust is not inherently
fraudulent.108 While critics have argued that self-settled spendthrift trusts are
inherently fraudulent, these trusts can be created for non-fraudulent purposes, such
as safeguarding assets for loved ones while allowing settlors to maintain control
over asset distribution. In addition to asset protection, transfer tax minimization
is also a non-fraudulent purpose for establishing a self-settled spendthrift trust.109
The most obvious benefit of a self-settled spendthrift trust is that trust
property is shielded from involuntary creditors, such as tort claimants.110 Selfsettled spendthrift trusts serve as “a safeguard against financial uncertainties and
unanticipated litigation.”111 The United States’ litigation system is often viewed
as pro-plaintiff, giving injured plaintiffs more than their fair share when it comes
to monetary judgments.112 Proponents of self-settled spendthrift trusts argue
such trusts protect settlors from meritless claims.113 While all people should pay
their bills, “not all bills are just.”114 “Deep pocket defendants” frequently become
targets of tort litigation.115 The self-settled spendthrift trust is less of a means to

108

See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.

David G. Shaftel, Comparison of the Domestic Asset Protection Trust Statutes, American
College of Trust and Estate Counsel (April 2014).
109

110
Sirknen, supra note 99, at 144–45; see Paul M. Roder, American Asset Protection Trusts:
Alaska and Delaware Move ‘Offshore’ Trusts onto the Mainland, 49 Syracuse L. Rev. 1253 (1999)
(“Professionals exposed to malpractice suits, such as doctors, lawyers, and accountants, and business
officers and directors exposed to toxic tort liability, as well as those individuals who fear hefty
divorce settlements, all have sought the protection afforded in offshore asset protection trusts.”).
111
Susanna C. Brennan, Changes in Climate: The Movement of Asset Protection Trusts from
International to Domestic Shores and its Effect on Creditor’s Rights, 79 Or. L. Rev. 755, 765 (2000)
(“The growing popularity of asset protection and its supporting industry most likely occurred in
response to economic and social factors including the increase in litigation and legal liability.”).

Sirknen, supra note 99, at 144–45 (stating that the American judicial system permits
“attorneys [to] move mass tort cases into states or jurisdictions with favorable regimes, due to
plaintiff-leaning legal rules, pro-plaintiff judges, pro-plaintiff juries, and judicial ‘innovations’
such as consolidations or bouquet trials that substantially increase expected jury awards”); James
R. Copland, Administrative Compensation for Pharmaceutical and Vaccine-Related Injuries, 8 Ind.
Health L. Rev. 275, 282–83 (2010–2011).
112

Sirknen, supra note 99, at 144 (“[I]n a system where persons are . . . unwilling to accept
responsibility for their own actions, even if they are negligent, why should . . . anyone else
wonder why there is also some number of persons unwilling to accept responsibility for their own
liabilities?”); Henry J. Lischer, Jr., Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Pallbearers to Liability?, 35 Real
Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 479, 526 (2000).
113
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Sirknen, supra note 99, at 144.

See Judith Camile Glasscock, Emptying the Deep Pocket in Mass Tort Litigation, 18 St.
Mary’s L.J. 977, 979 (1987).
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avoid debts and more a mechanism to protect individuals from losing everything
they have spent years earning.116
Others see the possibility of forming the trust as a form of protecting against
their own compulsion to spend.117 Individuals that come into wealth may have
the inability to control their urge to spend; self-settled spendthrift trusts can be
used as a tool to restrain excess spending.118 The self-settled spendthrift trust
can be structured to only allow for periodic distributions; thus, these periodic
distributions can limit the distribution amount to what is necessary for the
individual to live on. It also prevents them from borrowing against their assets by
taking the trust res out of the ownership of the settlor.119 Together, these benefits
to individuals of allowing self-settled spendthrift trusts weigh heavily against any
risk for abuse.

B. Economic Considerations for Allowing Self-Settled Spendthrift Trusts
In addition to benefitting the settlor, there are significant economic
considerations for allowing self-settled spendthrift trusts. From an economic
perspective, self-settled spendthrift trust statutes benefit the United States by
attracting trust business to local banks and trust companies.120 These statutes allow
sizeable domestic investment and make offshore trusts inessential.121 Keeping
trust business in the states will benefit the United States economy considerably.122
It is better to keep trust business domestic by endorsing a restricted self-settled
spendthrift trust rather than invalidating these trusts and pushing settlors into
foreign jurisdictions to protect their assets.
For Wyoming, allowing for self-settled spendthrift trusts means investments
are made within the state, ultimately boosting the state’s economy and bringing

Id. (“Excessive awards have resulted in economic disaster to some American business
enterprises.”). “For the most part, asset protection settlors will have honest motives and should be
allowed to protect the assets they have amassed through years of working and prudent investing.”
Sirknen, supra note 99, at 159.
116

117
Hirsch, supra note 9, at 2711 (“Persons who recognize in themselves a compulsion to
overspend and overborrow may wish to establish an asset protection trust in order to shield their
assets from their own weaknesses of will, and they may be content to suffer, or even seek to contrive,
their own exile from the market for credit.”).
118

Id.

119

Id.

Hirsch, supra note 9, at 2687; Sirknen, supra note 99, at 150 (“Corporate trustees,
estate planning lawyers, and settlors presumably all benefit financially from the use of [asset
protection trusts].”).
120
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Sirknen, supra note 99, at 79.
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jobs to Wyoming.123 Wyoming is considered a trust-friendly state.124 Not only
does Wyoming have the QST statute, but Wyoming also has no state income
tax, has a 1000-year term for the rule against perpetuities for trusts, discretionary
trusts, directed trusts, purpose trusts, and has unregulated private trust
companies.125 Clay D. Geittmann, a fellow of the American College of Trust
and Estate Counsel, discussed the benefits of the QST. He argues that it is “one
more step in making Wyoming a competitor, if not a leader, in the area of trust
law.”126 He, too, recognized the importance of the protections within Wyoming’s
statute: “[T]he principal drafters strived to provide a mechanism for the creation
of self-settled asset protection trusts while discouraging the abuse of these trusts
by those who would use them to defraud creditors. The goal was really to keep
Wyoming competitive but not to attract disreputable persons and business.”127
The QST has become an effective mechanism for individuals to transfer wealth
and has helped Wyoming remain a leading jurisdiction for trust formation. These
economic considerations are just one more reason why states should follow the
lead of Wyoming and pass self-settled spendthrift trust legislation similar to
Wyoming’s QST.

C. Statutory Limitations Protect Against Abuse and Fraud
Despite the benefits to settlors and the economy, there are still risks for
abuse and fraud when allowing individuals to shield their assets behind selfsettled spendthrift trusts. Despite the risks, Wyoming statute provides sufficient
limitations on the self-settled spendthrift trust to protect against any fraud or
abuse. The statute requires the trust to be irrevocable, preventing the settlor
from treating the trust as a shell for the sole purpose of defrauding creditors; it
requires complete relinquishment of trust corpus. In addition to requiring the
trust be irrevocable, the sworn affidavit requires the settlor to assert that they
are not creating the trust with fraudulent intent, the creation of the trust will
not render them insolvent, there are no pending or threatened court actions
against them, they are not contemplating bankruptcy, and they are not behind on

123

See infra notes 111–14 and accompanying text.

Christopher M. Reimer & Amy M. Staehr, Why Choose Wyoming?, 21.5 STEP Journal 55
(June 2013), available at http://lrw-law.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/why-choose-wyoming.pdf.
124

Id.; Reimer, supra note 19, at 166–67 (“Given its strong asset protection laws, lack of
income taxes, and recently revised Limited Liability Company (LLC) statutes, Wyoming is quickly
outpacing other top trust situs states in terms of attracting new business. . . . Wyoming has
adopted the UTC but has made over 100 substantive changes—resulting in an especially settlorfriendly code.”).
125
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Clay D. Geittmann, Chaos to Comprehension: Estate Planning in Wyoming, 30 Wyo. Law.
18, 20 (Dec. 2007).
127
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child support payments.128 While a sworn affidavit does not guarantee the settlor
will not defraud creditors, the document does create some reassurance that the
statements were made under oath or penalty of perjury, and it serves as evidence
of the statement’s accuracy.129
Wyoming statute also provides for public policy exceptions—circumstances
where public policy demands that the QST does not shield a debtor’s assets.130 For
example, Wyoming recognizes exceptions for child support obligations to ensure
that the settlor is fulfilling his legal obligation to provide for his children.131 The
exception recognizes that child support is not a typical contractual obligation
but rather a societal obligation to take care of one’s family. The statute also
ensures that trust res listed on a financial statement or application is accessible
to that creditor.132 This exception prevents the debtor from using the trust assets
as collateral for a loan, then subsequently shielding the assets from creditor
reach when it comes time to collect. Thus, this exception significantly reduces
the opportunity for a secured creditor to be left with no recourse. These two
exceptions further limit the chance for fraud and abuse.133
Additionally, there is no need for fear of deception.134 Trust property is
shielded from creditors because it is no longer in the name of the settlor—it
becomes trust property. For example, once real estate owned by a settlor named
John F. Smith becomes trust property, the real estate is no longer under the
name “John F. Smith,” but rather is retitled as “The John F. Smith Irrevocable
Trust” and “John F. Smith, Trustee.” There is no deceit because the ownership
of the property serves as an “alert to the world” that the property is inaccessible
to creditors.135 Therefore, a creditor who does his due diligence is not fooled.136
Furthermore, current law requires the corpus of the trust to be segregated and
earmarked in order to distinguish trust assets from settlor assets—much like
business assets are separate from a business owner’s personal assets.137 Of course, it

128

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-523 (2013).

129

See id. § 4-10-523.
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Id. § 4-10-520.
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See supra Part II.G.
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Hirsch, supra note 9, at 2688–89.

“APT’s could potentially benefit the public by encouraging all creditors to actually be
diligent in extending credit, thereby reducing credit losses and decreasing the burden that those
losses place on the public in the form of higher interest rates and fees.” Sirknen, supra note 99,
at 151.
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creation of asset protection trusts depart from these fundamental trust principles. Hence, asset
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is possible to transfer a piece of property into the trust after a creditor has already
loaned the money in reliance on the settlor’s assets. However, Wyoming’s statute
addresses this concern for abuse by requiring the sworn affidavit and providing
that if the trust res is listed on a financial statement or application, it is accessible
to that creditor.138
For additional protection from abuse and fraud, Wyoming’s statute allows a
creditor to bring a claim under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (UFTA).139
The UFTA requires creditors to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
transfer of property to the trust was fraudulent.140 A transfer is fraudulent and will
be set aside if it is found that the debtor made the transfer with “actual intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor” or if the transfer was made with constructive
fraudulent intent.141 In determining intent, the court looks at a variety of factors,
including whether the debtor was sued before the transfer was made, whether the
debtor transferred substantially all of his assets, whether the debtor was insolvent
during or shortly after the transfer was made, and whether the debtor made the
transfer shortly before or after a substantial debt was incurred.142
A less obvious protection, but one that significantly reduces the risk of fraud
and abuse, the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct state: “A lawyer shall not
counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows
is criminal or fraudulent.”143 Therefore, a lawyer puts his license to practice on
the line if he assists a client in forming a self-settled trust with the intent to
defraud creditors.144 Additionally, a lawyer could be subject to malpractice for
failing to relay to clients that self-settled spendthrift trusts cannot be established
for fraudulent or illegal purposes.145 These limitations, together, are sufficient to
discourage abuse of self-settled spendthrift trusts and limit the chance for settlors
to defraud their present and future creditors.

protection trusts are not stealth-vehicles, invisible to radar. Creditors can infer their presence from
their absence.”).
138

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 4-10-520, -523 (2013).
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Id. § 4-10-517.
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Id. § 34-14-205.
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Wyo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2(d).

Brennan, supra note 111, at 790-91 (“Attorneys may be charged with violating the code of
professional responsibility, either through their actions as co-conspirator, or by the violation of the
fiduciary duty to fully disclose to clients the details and ramifications of asset protection trusts.”).
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IV. Conclusion
As more states adopt statutes allowing self-settled spendthrift trusts, there
appears to be no turning back.146 The Qualified Spendthrift Trust is a beneficial
component of Wyoming’s Uniform Trust Code, and states should follow
Wyoming’s lead. The self-settled spendthrift trust provides substantial benefits
to settlors.147 Further, the self-settled spendthrift trust also provides substantial
economic benefits.148 Finally, Wyoming’s self-settled spendthrift trust does not
pose a serious risk for fraud or abuse because of the statutory limitations and
requirements for establishing the trust.149
Just as it took some time for scholars, lawmakers, and judges to overcome the
concern, uneasiness, and uncertainty surrounding the enforceability of spendthrift
trusts, it may take some time for self-settled spendthrift trusts to become more
widely accepted.150 Despite the concern, it looks like self-settled spendthrift trusts
are here to stay.
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See Hirsch, supra note 9, at 2711 (“Our political system incorporates checks and balances.
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these seriously threatened the national interests of the consumer credit industry, or of trial lawyers
(whose livelihoods depend on victims’ abilities to collect liability awards), then creditors’ and
trial lawyers’ own lobbyists would have leapt into action, bending ears and twisting arms in the
cloakroom. That no ears were deafened, nor arms sprained, as a matter of political vèritè, is revealing
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150

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol15/iss2/9

18

